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This paper uses data from two British workplace surveys to examine the impact of
unions on several training measures. It also evaluates the impact of unions and training
on earnings and two measures of firm performance. Union effects on training emerge
as fairly subtle, and are more positive when using individual rather than plant-wide
training data. A positive impact of training on earnings is detected in individual and
plant-wide wage data, albeit for one of the datasets. Union influence on wages is also
muted and union-training interaction effects vary greatly. However, instrumenting
training provides positive results for labour productivity and, again for one survey, for
financial performance as well.
* This paper was released for publication in January 2008.
** The authors thank the sponsors of WERS (DTI, ACAS, ERSC, and PSI) and the ESRC Data Archive.
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Theoretical Conjectures and the Existing Literature
3 Data
4 Findings
5 Conclusions
References
Appendix
ZAF 4/2007, S. 361Ð381 361Unions, Training and Firm Performance John T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield
1 Introduction
The issues of the productivity of workplace training
and union impact on firm performance are two of
the more controversial issues in applied labour eco-
nomics. The training question is complicated by the
diversity of training forms, measurement difficulties,
and the likelihood that training participants and
training firms will differ materially from their
counterparts without (or with less) training. The em-
pirical evidence from individual and firm data is
mixed, especially as regards the productivity of on-
the-job or internal training.
For its part, the union literature is in one sense more
settled but lacks definition in the sense that the
manner in which unions may influence workforce
performance has been a black box. Implicitly, the
major exception to this statement is training. Thus,
in their early study of productivity using state-by-
industry aggregates, Brown and Medoff (1978) at-
tempted to go behind their finding of a positive
union productivity differential of between 22 and
30 per cent by including a quit rate variable in the
union-augmented production function. The effect
was to reduce the union coefficient estimate by
around one-fifth. In the years since this pioneering
study, however, interest in the mechanisms through
which unions might raise productivity has waned in
line with much reduced estimates of the magnitude
of that differential at lower levels of aggregation
(the U.S. literature is reviewed in Hirsch 2004, and
the British literature in Addison and Belfield 2004
and Metcalf 2003). But the potential for greater
training in union regimes (facilitated in part by re-
duced voluntary turnover) and the issue of its pro-
ductivity are no less valid topics of empirical inquiry
today than heretofore. Indeed, in Britain at least,
there is evidence of heightened interest in these is-
sues partly because of an apparent sea change in
union impact on firm performance allied in part to
bargaining structure, and partly because of research
into the impact of high performance work practices
(e.g. Wood and de Menezes 1998; Metcalf 2003).
In the present study, we seek to examine these links
using private-sector establishment data for Britain.
Specifically, we consider the determinants of train-
ing to include unionism and then examine the im-
pact of unions and training on earnings, labour pro-
ductivity, and financial performance. Although we
have information on just one type of training Ð
namely, employer-provided off-the-job training Ð
we shall consider its influence along three dimen-
sions: incidence, intensity (strictly, coverage) and du-
ration. We also deploy both individual and plant-
level measures of training. Our earnings analysis
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likewise uses linked employer-employee data as well
as plant-level average earnings. In investigating the
impact of the two key variables on labour productiv-
ity and financial performance, however, we shall use
plant-level information alone because of the very
limited sampling of workers. In our analysis of plant
performance, we will allow for the endogeneity of
training.
To motivate the present study, we first outline the
circumstances in which unions might influence train-
ing investments by the firm, and the manner in
which the productivity of such investments has been
addressed in the existing literature. We next de-
scribe the datasets used in this inquiry. There follows
a detailed presentation of our findings. A brief sum-
mary concludes.
2 Theoretical Conjectures and the
Existing Literature
At the level of theory, unions might be associated
with either more or less training. A negative union
effect might be expected if the union premium im-
pairs the ability of employees to finance training.
Assuming that labour markets are perfect, general
training investments should be paid for by the
worker since the skills learned are transferable and
are thus fully appropriable by workers. Just as with a
binding minimum wage, the payment of union wages
prevents workers from taking a wage cut and financ-
ing their general training investments. More gener-
ally, seniority rules and wage compression may also
reduce the worker’s incentive to undertake or invest
in training.1 Furthermore, the scale of such negative
effects of unions on training might be expected to
vary directly with union strength or bargaining
power.
The literature has focused on the situations in which
unions can stimulate training. Thus, the expression
of union voice, underwritten by the wage premium,
should cut down on labor turnover and increase the
incentive of the employer to invest in firm-specific
training because of the longer payback period (Free-
man and Medoff 1984). A more thorough-going ap-
plication of the collective voice model would of
course encompass workplace governance. A number
of aspects of a governance apparatus may be ex-
pected to facilitate training by foreclosing the op-
portunities for workers to behave opportunistically.
1 The classic reference is Mincer (1983); see also Lindbeck et al.
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But a governance apparatus that includes unions
may counteract the tendency of the employer to
misrepresent his private information. More con-
cretely, there may be a hold-up problem on the part
of the employer: firms might hold-up the sunk in-
vestments of workers in training, leading to an un-
der-investment in human capital. Here the union
could act to prevent the hold-up problem by making
the firm honour its commitments (Menezes-Filho
and Van Reenen 2003, p. 299).
The unions-as-a-commitment-device or agent of
contract enforcement Ð first discussed by Malcom-
son (1983) Ð can be extended to cover the firm-fi-
nancing of general training investments in circum-
stances where long-term wage contracts are other-
wise infeasible. For example, Dustmann and
Schönberg (2004) argue that (German) firms will
pay for apprentice training because of the union-
imposed wage floors that lead to wage compression.
Wage compression allows productivity to rise faster
than wages and the union wage level act as a guaran-
tee against subsequent employer opportunism. Re-
lated models suggesting that unions may move gen-
eral training closer to the social optimum either em-
phasize asymmetric information with respect to in-
cumbent and outside firms, in conjunction with wage
compression (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998) or com-
plementarities between general training and specific
training (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999).
Past British (if not U.S.) work on the determinants
of training has generally reported a positive union
effect. That is, not only older research using union
density (e.g. Greenhalgh and Mavrotas 1994; Arul-
ampalam, Booth, and Elias 1995) but also more re-
cent research using the preferred metric of union
recognition point to a statistically significant direct
association between unionism and training. Thus, for
example, using individual data from the 1993 Quar-
terly Labour Force Survey and establishment-level
data from the 1991 Employers’ Manpower and Skills
Practices Survey, Green, Machin, and Wilkinson
(1999) report that the incidence of training is posi-
tively related to union recognition. Union recogni-
tion is also reported to lead to an increased duration
of that training in hours/days. Reflecting recent Brit-
ish preoccupations, the authors also examine the
role of bargaining structure. The argument is that
the union wage will be higher where there are multi-
ple unions that bargain separately at the workplace,
with higher wages discouraging employers from pay-
ing for training courses (Green, Machin, and Wilkin-
son 1999, p. 181). They report that neither the inci-
dence nor the duration of training (from the em-
ployer survey) is affected by multiple unionism at
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the workplace.2 Interestingly, there is some indica-
tion in this study that the positive impact of union
recognition on training may be increased in the
presence of employee involvement mechanisms.
Similarly, in an exercise that matches employee to
establishment data from the WERS98, Böheim and
Booth (2004) report a positive correlation between
union recognition and employer-provided training
in the private sector for three out of the four worker
groups identified, namely, manual and nonmanual
males and nonmanual females. In an expanded
model that takes account of bargaining structure,
the main change is that for male manual workers
training incidence is only higher under union recog-
nition where there is multiple unionism with joint
bargaining. Otherwise, bargaining structure has no
separate effect on training incidence.
The incidence (and extent) of workplace training is
one thing, its productive impact quite another. The
traditional approach in Britain to measuring the
productivity of training has been via earnings func-
tions (some limitations of which are noted below).3
Although there is an extensive literature on the im-
pact of educational investments that dealing explic-
itly with work-related training is less developed.
Nevertheless, most studies point to statistically sig-
nificant positive returns to such training (see the
survey by Cohn and Addison, 1998) even if few ad-
dress the interaction between unionism and train-
ing.4
Two recent studies by Forth and Millward (2004)
and Booth, Francesconi, and Zoega (2003) merit at-
tention. The principal focus of the former study is on
the role of high performance workplace practices,
including employee involvement. Using matched
employee-employer data from the WERS98 for the
private sector Ð the wage, training, and human capi-
tal/demographic variables are taken from the em-
ployee component of the survey and the establish-
ment data from the employer component of the sur-
2 The authors’ actual variable is the presence of multiple unions
at the workplace (interacted with union recognition), thus conflat-
ing separate and joint bargaining on the part of multiple unions.
3 For a wide-ranging German study of the effect of training on
earnings by type of employee and form of training, see Kuckulenz
and Zwick (2003).
4 A negative correlation between wages and training might be
anticipated: during the training period, workers are not fully pro-
ductive and will only become more productive after the training
is concluded (Bartel 1995). (We appreciate the contribution of a
reviewer in pointing this out.) However, our training measure is
retrospective, extending over an entire year. It therefore covers
periods before, during, and after training. Nevertheless, we recog-
nize that we may not have fully captured the wage effects of train-
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vey (see the data section below) Ð Forth and Mill-
ward report that (log) earnings are strongly posi-
tively related to certain training durations (viz. 1Ð2
days and 2Ð5 days) relative to no training. Some
effect of high performance work practices is also
found, seemingly underwritten by job security guar-
antees. As far as unionism is concerned, only its di-
rect effect on earnings is estimated. Although union
recognition is associated with a wage premium of
around 10 percent, this arises only in circumstances
of multiunionism (under both single-table and sepa-
rate bargaining). That is, there is no such wage dif-
ferential when there is only a single recognized un-
ion at the workplace. Forth and Millward note the
results of interacting high performance work practi-
ces with unionism, arguing that the premium associ-
ated with the former is augmented under multiple
unionism. But, to repeat, they do not interact union-
ism with the training argument.
This omission is tackled by Booth, Francesconi, and
Zoega (2003) in a study using information from the
British Household Panel Survey Data for a balanced
panel of full-time males, 1991Ð96. The analysis con-
siders both the duration of employer-provided train-
ing as in Forth and Millward (but now as a continu-
ous rather than a categorical variable) and also its
incidence. The authors find that union-covered
workers are significantly more likely to receive
training (between 5 and 9 percentage points) and to
receive longer training (between 3 and 4 days) than
their non-covered counterparts. (The lower esti-
mates are for the panel estimates.) Moreover, the
effects of training on wages are found to vary posi-
tively with union coverage, even as the positive ef-
fect of training on wages found using OLS is not
replicated in fixed effects estimates. Taking the au-
thors’ fixed effects estimates for incidence, for ex-
ample, it is found that union workers who receive
any training earn roughly 6 percent more than their
uncovered counterparts, half of which is the simple
union premium. The effect of training duration is
small, although the interaction of intensity and un-
ion recognition is again positive and statistically sig-
nificant. Finally, in a separate analysis of wage
growth that allows for changes in collective bargain-
ing status and training incidence/duration, the main
result is that bargaining coverage is much more im-
portant for earnings growth than receiving training
or obtaining longer training without gaining union
coverage. In short, there is little in these data to sug-
gest that unionism is associated with lower returns
to training or lower wage growth.
But if unions do not reduce the incentives to acquire
work-related training it is too early to conclude from
one study that the productivity of training in union
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plants is higher than in nonunion establishments.
Moreover, as Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen
(2000, p. 6) caution, earnings “only tell half the
story.” The course of earnings reflects not only value
marginal product development but also the share
principle covering training investments (both firm-
specific and also general training in the light of re-
cent theoretical developments stressing labour mar-
ket imperfections), effort-motivating career wage
profiles, product market imperfections, and indeed
other types of training investments (principally in-
formal types of training on which the standard data
sets are silent). It is therefore necessary to supple-
ment the earnings function approach with a more
direct measure of productivity than the wage. In-
deed, testing modern theories of wage compression
and training require such data to test the implication
that productivity increases faster than earnings.
There is a small but growing training-in-the-produc-
tion-function literature. A summary of the main
studies is consigned to Appendix Table 1.5 As can be
seen, just one study is for Britain, namely, Dearden,
Reed, and Van Reenen’s (2000, 2006) analysis of a
panel of industries between 1983 and 1996, and
where the training information is derived from the
Labour Force Survey. The study is notable for its
use of an extended panel with information on train-
ing and productivity for each year of the sample pe-
riod. This enables the authors to deal with problems
of unobserved heterogeneity (some industries may
have lower rates of technological change and there-
fore offer less scope for training) and endogeneity
(training may be undertaken when its opportunity
costs is lower as when firms experience transitory
demand shocks) using GMM system methods. The
upshot of this approach is that weak training effects
on productivity detected in OLS are considerably
strengthened using a within group estimator and fur-
ther strengthened using a GMM estimator with en-
dogenous training. In robustness tests, the authors
report that collective voice effects do not seem to
underpin the stronger training results: the point esti-
mate of training is little affected by the inclusion of
a union measure (viz. density) (only available from
1989 onward) while the coefficient estimate for un-
ionism is negative albeit statistically insignificant.
(We note parenthetically that the union variable
when considered alongside training in the produc-
tion function literature is often statistically insignifi-
cant.)
Finally, Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen offer a
parallel earnings function analysis. Familiarly, the
5 Additional studies not cited in the table would include Ballot et
al. (2001) for France and Sweden, and Bellmann and Bücherl
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strong association between training and wages is
considerably reduced with controls for skills, but is
stronger in the within group estimates and more so
using the GMM estimator. But the wage gradient of
training is half the productivity gradient, leading the
authors to conclude that the earnings function ap-
proach “ignores the benefits the firm may capture
through higher profits” (Dearden, Reed, and Van
Reenen 2000, p. 53).
One problem with this important study apart from
its neglect of the union-training nexus Ð the produc-
tion function studies in Appendix Table 1 typically
ignore union impact6 and none considers the pro-
ductivity of training in union and nonunion re-
gimes Ð is possible aggregation bias. That said, this
level of analysis may capture externalities from
training (knowledge spillovers) that perforce escape
identification at the firm level.
The bottom line is that some progress has been
made in charting the impact of unions on workplace
training and of training on earnings and output.
However, only limited progress has been made in
determining how unionism might mediate the im-
pact of training on earnings, and there has been no
examination of this interaction for performance
measures other than earnings. The present exercise
seeks in part to redress this imbalance. It does so by
exploring the determinants of training in a frame-
work that investigates the impact of training and un-
ion recognition on two subjective measures of firm
performance, namely, relative labour productivity
and financial performance in addition to earnings.
3 Data
Our data are taken from the 1998 Workplace
Employee Relations Survey (WERS98) and the
6 An exception is Zwick (2005) who includes a codetermination
variable (i.e. works council presence) as a regressor in his lagged
productivity estimates of training intensity and alternative forms
of training. Works council presence is associated with higher pro-
ductivity in his OLS estimates. In his two-step panel estimates,
however, codetermination is no longer statistically significant
whether or not selection into training is accommodated. He ob-
tains stronger results for the works council variable in a subse-
quent paper examining training intensity alone (albeit over a
longer sample period) that also controls for time invariant unob-
served heterogeneity between firms and the endogeneity of train-
ing (Zwick 2006). Neither study tests whether the productivity
effects of training are contingent on other establishment charac-
teristics or the establishment’s environment, but in a separate
treatment examining the effect of works councils on the produc-
tivity impact of direct employee participation, Zwick (2003) re-
ports that the payoff to such practices is restricted to works coun-
cil regimes. This study also looks at training, which is found to
have a bigger payoff in works council regimes. Unlike employee
participation, however, training is now assumed to be exogenous.
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2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey
(WERS04). Each survey follows closely the format
of the earlier Workplace Industrial Relations Sur-
veys/WIRS (for 1980, 1984, and 1990), albeit with
some differences (see Cully et al. 1999). WERS98 is
a national survey of 2,191 British establishments in
the public and private sectors with at least 10 work-
ers; respectively, the WERS04 has data on 2,295 es-
tablishments with at least 5 workers. Otherwise, the
surveys are almost identical in terms of questions,
sampling frames, and representation of workplaces
across the British economy. The main focus of the
surveys is a management questionnaire that provides
detailed information on the composition of the
workforce, management of the personnel function,
representation at work, consultation and communi-
cation, payment systems and pay determination,
workplace flexibility, and (largely qualitative) infor-
mation on workplace performance. In addition, 25
employees at each workplace Ð or all employees at
smaller establishments Ð are randomly selected for
an employee questionnaire.7 The individual worker
questionnaire inquires of the employee respondent
the nature of the job held, the training received, atti-
tudes towards the organization and management,
representation at work, as well as educational level
and earnings. Unlike earlier WIRS, therefore,
WERS98 and WERS04 include information on both
individual and workplace characteristics. Both sur-
veys also have high response rates. Using both 1998
and 2004 data illuminates changes in workplaces
over time as well as providing a very recent descrip-
tion of British workplaces. (More details are pro-
vided in Kersley et al. 2005).
For that part of our analysis dealing with the deter-
minants of training and the effect of training on wa-
ges, we will match the employee and workplace (i.e.
management survey) components of WERS98/
WERS04. We shall also present parallel results using
workplace data on training and earnings informa-
tion from the management survey. Earnings from
the employee questionnaire are in the form of gross
weekly earnings that are reported in twelve earnings
bands.8 Using the relevant midpoint value in con-
junction with reported hours of work, we derive a
measure of gross hourly wages. Earnings from the
7 It follows that the matched employee-employer aspect of the
survey is considerably more limited than in other datasets, and,
in particular, the German LIAB. Also, because the two datasets
are not longitudinal but harmonized cross-sectional surveys we
cannot apply the techniques detailed by Abowd et al. (1999).
8 For the highest and lowest bands, we compute a hypothetical
midpoint assuming that the range matches that of the next and
the previous earnings band, respectively. The selfsame procedure
is used in the case of all other variables with open intervals. Prior
studies using WERS98 data have found that results are not sensi-
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management survey are in the form of gross annual
wages in six earnings bands. Using midpoint val-
ues Ð this time in association with the number of
workers populating each band Ð we are able to con-
struct a measure of plant ‘median’ earnings.
The critical training variable also differs as between
the two components of WERS98/WERS04, even if
in each case it refers to formal off-the-job training.
For the employee survey the training question asks:
“During the last 12 months, how much training have
you had, either paid for or organized by your em-
ployer?”9 The employee is asked is required to tick
one of six 6 boxes: ‘none,’ ‘less than 1 day,’ ‘1 to less
than 2 days,’ ‘2 to less than 5 days,’ ‘5 to less than 10
days,’ and ‘10 days or more’. From these responses,
we construct two training measures: first, we define
training incidence to take the value of 1 if the re-
spondent received any such training, zero otherwise;
second, we define training duration as either 0 or the
midpoint of the reported bands.
The (main) training question in the management
survey asks: “What proportion of experienced em-
ployees in the largest occupational group have had
formal off the job training over the past 12
months?”10 There are seven possible responses,
comprising upper and lower limits of ‘all’ and ‘none’
and five intermediate bands. We define training inci-
dence to be 1 where the employer responds that
more than 0 percent received training. We also use
the question to define training intensity (or cover-
age), assigning the plant to one of the seven inter-
vals, using the midpoints of the bands as appropri-
ate. We also employ responses to a second training
question in the employer survey to derive a measure
of training duration analogous to that contained in
the employee survey. This second question asks the
employer to identify which of six intervals best de-
scribes “on average, about how much time did these
... employees ... spend in formal off-the-job training
sessions over the past 12 months?” We weight these
hourly values by the corresponding intensity or cov-
erage values to produce an estimate of plant-level
training duration.
In addition to the conventional use of earnings as a
performance indicator (see the literature review),
we also use two other outcome indicators, namely,
9 The employee is asked to “include only training away from your
normal place of work, but it could be on or off the premises”.
More generally, we do not of course know how much training Ð
more or less Ð the worker received in any preceding interval. The
same limitation attaches to the management questionnaire.
10 The survey explicitly includes the prompt: “off the job training
is training away from the normal place of work, but either on or
off the premises”.
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labour productivity and financial performance,
taken from the management survey. Given the par-
tial sampling of employees in the employee survey,
we do not link these data to the employee survey.
Thus, when we form an instrument for training for
inclusion in the performance equations (see below)
this is based on plant-level data alone.
We next briefly describe the labour productivity and
financial performance dependent variables. Each is
subjective, the manager respondent being asked to
“assess your workplace’s labour productivity/finan-
cial performance” vis-a `-vis the average of “other es-
tablishments in the same industry.” Responses in
each case are coded ‘a lot better/better than aver-
age,’ ‘above average,’ ‘about average,’ and ‘a lot be-
low/below average.’ For both indicators, we define
above average performance as 1 (combining the first
three responses), zero otherwise.11
Our measure(s) of unionism is the same across all
estimations and is a plant-level measure. Union rec-
ognition is set equal to 1 if the employer recognizes
any trade union at the place of work for the purpose
of negotiating pay and conditions for any sections of
the workforce. We also use an alternative measure
of unionism based on bargaining structure. Vis-a `-vis
no recognition (the omitted category), we identify
circumstances in which the employer bargained with
a single union or with multiple unions either jointly
(i.e. single-table bargaining) or severally.
The remaining variables are more easily described
because they have been widely used in previous em-
pirical work. Thus, the equations using as dependent
variables individual-level earnings and training data
from the employee questionnaire contain standard
human capital arguments (such as educational at-
tainment, occupational controls, and age and ten-
ure) and demographic controls (such as marital sta-
tus, gender, and ethnicity). They also include the
same workplace covariates as are used in all equa-
tions based on management survey data alone Ð
other than those used to identify the plant-level
training equations fitted to those data. In addition
to various high performance working practices (de-
scribed below), the workplace-level arguments in-
clude labour force composition (proportion of fe-
male, part-time, and manual workers), plant and
wider organization characteristics (establishment/or-
11 We note here that these are subjective measures of perform-
ance and productivity (financial data is not available for the
WERS98); and as such we place more reliance on the results for
earnings. Nevertheless, these measures have been used exten-
sively in other empirical investigations into the determinants of
firm performance (see Addison and Belfield 2004).John T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield Unions, Training and Firm Performance
ganizational size, status as a single operating estab-
lishment or otherwise, and capital intensity), prod-
uct market competition, firm ownership, and (eight)
industry dummies.
As for the high performance working practices,
these comprise team working (at least 60 percent of
employees work in the largest occupational group
work in formally designated teams), quality circles
(presence of workplace groups that solve specific
problems or discuss aspects of performance or qual-
ity), briefing groups (a system of briefing nonmana-
gerial employees at the workplace that occurs at
least monthly and where at least 10 percent of time
is dedicated to questions/contributions from em-
ployees), information disclosure, (management reg-
ularly provides workers with information on the
plant’s financial situation and external investment
plans), and financial participation (based on eligibil-
ity to participate in an ESOP arrangement or profit-
or performance-related pay). We do not allow for
the bundling such practices or for their frequency
and intensity (on which, see Forth and Millward
2004) as our main interest lies elsewhere.
One practice that is often considered to belong to
the group of innovative work practices is job security
guarantees. We would anticipate that job security
guarantees either call for a more flexible (i.e. more
highly trained) workforce or stimulate training in
the downturn. Two other rather more obvious train-
ing-related arguments proxy the scope for training
and the priority accorded training. As an indicator
of the scope for training, we deploy a dummy varia-
ble set equal to 1 if it normally takes at least one
month before new employees in the largest occupa-
tional group are able to do their job, and 0 if less than
that. And, as an indicator of the priority accorded
training, we use another dichotomous variable that
assumes the value of 1 if the establishment sets tar-
gets for workplace training, 0 otherwise. All three
variables are used to help identify the training equa-
tion.
In addition, these three variables are used as instru-
ments for training in our labour productivity and fi-
nancial performance equations. Recognizing that
outcomes may be endogenously determined with
the decision to provide training, we perform an in-
strumental variables regression. Predicted values for
each measure of training Ð along with their interac-
tions with unionism Ð replace the endogenous re-
gressor (the direct measures of training).
Finally, we restrict our analysis to the private sector
and use the sampling weights given in the two sur-
veys. For the WERS98, our cross sections overall
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cover 17,092 individuals with complete data on 1,100
establishments. The corresponding values for the
WERS04 are 13,643 individuals and 1,449 establish-
ments.
Descriptive statistics for the matched employee-em-
ployer sample and for the workplace sample are re-
ported in Appendix Tables 2 and 3, respectively. For
the former sample, the incidence of training across
the two surveys is quite similar, at 51 percent and
59 percent. Most establishments offer some form of
training, with the rate higher in 2004. For training
intensity, more firms offer either all or few workers
training in 2004 whereas the spread was more even
in 1998. The durations of training are also similar:
the mean duration of training is 2.86 days for the
WERS 1998 and 2.71 for the WERS 2004. However,
union recognition is lower in 2004 Ð at 43 percent
compared with 51 percent in 1998. The difference
is mainly explained by the lower rate of multiple
unionism in 2004. For the latter workplace samples,
the measures for financial performance and labour
productivity are very close; just over one-half of
firms are identified as having financial performance
“better than average” and almost exactly half report
“better than average” labour productivity. The
workplace-level data do, however, reveal a much
sharper difference in union recognition: with 42 per-
cent of workplaces being recognized in 1998 versus
just 15 percent in the 2004 sample.
4 Findings
Our starting point is the determinants of training
and earnings. In each case, we will provide results
using both individual and plant-level measures of
training and earnings. As noted above, the former
information (as well as the human capital and demo-
graphic measures) are derived from the employee
questionnaire of each WERS and are also matched
to establishment-level information from the man-
agement questionnaires. This part of our analysis
corresponds most closely with the existing British
literature. Our separate results using plant-level
training information are based on workplace-level
data from the management surveys alone and are
organically linked to the subsequent analyses of
plant productivity and financial performance.
Table 1 provides summary probit and tobit regres-
sion results for individual-level training incidence
and duration, respectively, using two measures of
unionism in each case. Panel (a) provides results
from the WERS98, and panel (b) from the
WERS04. As can be seen, whether or not a worker
receives training appears uninfluenced by the union
recognition status of the plant or by the structureUnions, Training and Firm Performance John T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield
of collective bargaining. Results for the full set of
regressors Ð not provided in the table but available
from the authors upon request Ð reveal that com-
paratively few of the variables taken from the em-
ployee surveys are statistically significant.12 Rather,
plant-level variables tend to dominate. Thus, the
likelihood that the worker receives training fre-
quency is higher the larger the plant and where the
organization deploys high performance work practi-
ces, and it is lower the larger the share of part-timers
and manual workers in the workforce and in single-
plant firms.
12 That said, for the WERS04 the coefficient estimates for gender
and tenure as well as those for some of the education categories
(and almost all of the occupational arguments) are well deter-
mined.
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For its part, training duration also appears unaf-
fected by union recognition per se in either the
WERS98 or the WERS04. But for the former data-
set at least differences emerge by bargaining struc-
ture: compared with plants without union recogni-
tion, workers in establishments that bargain with
multiple (single) unions offer longer (shorter) train-
ing spells over the course of a year. For the WERS04
although the coefficient estimates for all forms of
collective bargaining are positive, none approaches
statistical significance at conventional levels. Most
of the plant-level variables found to influence train-
ing incidence operate in the same manner with re-
spect to training duration. Interestingly, in the case
of the WERS98, the role of the human capital and
demographic variables taken from the employee
survey assume much more importance for training
duration than they did for training incidence. (Nota-John T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield Unions, Training and Firm Performance
ble across both datasets is a decline in the duration
of training with age and tenure.) Also of interest
is the finding across both datasets that U.K.-owned
plants offer shorter training spells than their foreign-
owned counterparts.
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The corresponding results for training using plant-
level variables alone are given in Table 2. The equa-
tions now include three plant-level measures not en-
countered in Table 1 that are used to identify our
plant-level training equation for subsequent stagesUnions, Training and Firm Performance John T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield
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of the analysis (on which more below). The results
given in the first four columns of the table refer to
the incidence and coverage of training by union
measure, while the last two relate to our imputed
duration of training measure. The most notable re-
sult is the general statistical insignificance of the un-
ion variable. Union recognition is not statistically
significant in any model. For the WERS98 the dif-
ferent collective bargaining structures show either
insignificant or inconclusive impacts: for incidence,
single-table bargaining is positive; for duration, mul-
tiple bargaining is negative. For the WERS04 no un-
ion variable attains statistical significance.
Interestingly, two out of the three variables we con-
sider as identifiers Ð picking up the scope for train-
ing (time taken for new workers to become profi-
cient) and the priority accorded training (targets set
for workplace training) Ð are both positive and well
determined across all six regressions for the
WERS98. Although the variable proxying the need
for a more flexible workforce and/or suggestive of
more training in the downturn plays no role for the
WERS98, the opposite is true for the WERS04
where the coefficient estimate for job security guar-
antees is statistically significant in four out of six
specifications. Training is higher in the WERS04, as
in the WERS98, when targets are set for workplace
training but there is no indication that the time
taken for new workers to become proficient in a job
is a determinant of either the intensity or duration
of training in the later dataset.
As far as the other covariates are concerned, across
both data sets the results for training frequency (in-
cidence and coverage) in the first four columns are
roughly coincident. Thus, training frequency is de-
clining in the share of part-timers and manual work-
ers and increasing in establishment size and with
three out of four high performance work practices.
For training duration, although much the same argu-
ments are statistically significant for the WERS98
the results are weaker for the WERS04. Interest-
ingly, older establishments seem to train workers
longer in both surveys.
The impact of training and unions on (log) hourly
pay using matched employee-establishment data is
shown in Table 3a. As before, two characterizations
of unionism are provided. Also as before, we con-
sider both training incidence and duration and all
specifications include interactions between training
and unionism. Table 3b supplements this analysis
with results for the categorical measure of training
duration, using the actual bands identified in the
employee questionnaire, although in this case only
the union recognition argument is deployed for rea-
sons of expositional convenience.
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There are few points of agreement as regards the
estimates in panels (a) and (b) of Table 3a. Begin-
ning with the WERS98, then, it seems to be the case
that training incidence, if not duration, is positively
associated with earnings but union recognition per
se is not, while the interaction between training inci-
dence and union recognition is positive and margin-Unions, Training and Firm Performance John T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield
ally significant. Once we amend the union measure
to reflect bargaining structure, it can be seen that
(direct) union effects on earnings seem to be con-
fined to multiple unionism, while the interaction be-
tween unionism and training incidence is positive
and significant for one type of multiple unionism,
namely, where there is single-table bargaining.
Where training duration is expressed as a continu-
ous variable neither it nor union recognition is sta-
tistically significant, and the same is true of their
interaction. Nevertheless, the union argument alone
is well determined in the case of multiunionism.
Once training duration is entered in categorical
form, it can be seen from Table 3b that some inter-
mediate levels of training have well determined
positive effects. While the union recognition coeffi-
cient estimate in this specification is now strongly
significant, those of the interaction terms are nega-
tive Ð the one exception is the interaction with
training of ten days duration or more where training
itself is not positively associated with wages.
Turning to the WERS04 in Table 3a, one notable
result is the virtual absence of any union effect on
earnings. This outcome is not unexpected and seems
to mark a further reduction in what we might gener-
ically term the disadvantages of unionism (Addison
and Belfield 2004). No less notable is the general
absence of a positive effect of training on wages. In
the case of training incidence, training only achieves
statistical significance when interacted with one of
the (multiunionism) bargaining structure arguments.
Exactly the same result applies for training duration
in continuous form. Only when we consider training
duration in categorical form (Table 3b) are both un-
ion and training effects more evident, and more in
line with the WERS98. Unions have a small but well
determined positive effect on wages, and all training
intervals Ð with the exception of the shortest and
longest spells Ð are associated with higher earnings.
That said, there is less suggestion of material inter-
actions in either direction between union recogni-
tion and training duration.13
13 We also fitted a (log median annual) wage equation to data
from the management survey, using plant-level covariates alone.
This estimation serves as a check for plant-level wage effects from
‘high-training’ firms. For the WERS98 some statistically signifi-
cant associations between training and wages were found for
training intensity and training duration if not its incidence. There
were no systematic union effects on earnings, and where signifi-
cant the effects were inconclusive. Further, just two out of a total
of twelve union-training interaction terms were statistically signif-
icant. For the WERS04 very few of the coefficients are statisti-
cally significant. In re-estimating these wage equations excluding
interaction terms, the coefficient estimates for each training meas-
ure were uniformly positive and statistically significant while
those for unionism were always poorly determined in the case
of the WERS98, and statistically insignificant throughout for the
WERS04.
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By way of summary, our findings up to this point
differ from those reported in the literature in a num-
ber of important respects. One is the absence of any
simple effect of unions on training incidence, dura-
tion, or coverage. And while our findings on the un-
ion wage premium are consistent with the litera-
ture Ð in denying a simple association between un-
ionism and pay and noting that the premium where
observed (for the WERS98) hinges on bargaining
structure Ð the near absence of significantly positive
interaction effects between unionism and training
conflicts with the optimistic findings of the one Brit-
ish study to have investigated this issue.14
These observations and the limitations of wages as
a measure of productivity led us to consider whether
stronger effects of training (and unions) might be
discernible using the labour productivity question in
each workplace survey, as well as the longer-term
financial performance indicator. It will be recalled
that both indicators are dummy variables where
above average performance equals 1, zero otherwise.
Initially, when we regressed our labour productivity
measure on the reported values of various training
and union arguments, the results were unspectacu-
lar. In the case of the WERS98, for example, just
one association was statistically significant (a nega-
tive coefficient estimate for single-table bargaining
under multiple unionism). For WERS04, the union
effects were more clearly negative, and the training
results weakly positive.
Given possible endogeneity bias, both performance
equations were duly estimated with predicted rather
than actual training values. We instrumented our
three plant-level training variables using the specifi-
cations in Table 2. The validity of the instrumental
variables estimation depends on finding variables
correlated with the endogenous regressor (training),
but uncorrelated with the performance measures.
14 We ran a series of sensitivity checks on the training determi-
nants and wage equations using alternative estimation techniques.
These techniques were applied to see if the coefficients were
driven by unobservable firm-specific characteristics. (Full results
are available from the authors upon request.) The first check was
to re-estimate the wage equations to adjust for intra-firm correla-
tions (using the post-estimation cluster command, see Moulton
1986). The second alternative was to apply a random effects esti-
mator across firms. Overall, the changes were minor and again do
not point to a consistent pattern of union influence on training or
a more emphatic impact of unions and training on wages. For the
WERS98, unions still do not increase training incidence whatever
the configuration of unionism; although they do now elevate
training duration, with single unions now no longer having a neg-
ative impact. The WERS04 coefficient estimates remain statisti-
cally insignificant at the .05 level. For wages, the impact of train-
ing incidence and its interactions is now weaker but the effects
remain as strong for the duration measures in the WERS98.
Again, no clear effects from unions or training emerge when us-
ing the WERS04.John T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield Unions, Training and Firm Performance
As was shown in Table 2, two of our three instru-
mental variables are strongly correlated with train-
ing incidence, intensity, and duration. When these
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variables were included in the labour productivity
and financial performance equations they evinced
very weak explanatory power (the strongest effectUnions, Training and Firm Performance John T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield
being the experience requirement, although this too
was inconsistent). Next, we ran all the equations (six
per outcome indicator) using the reported training
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values. A comparison of the coefficient estimates for
actual and predicted training Ð a direct Hausman
test was not performed because the equations areJohn T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield Unions, Training and Firm Performance
not OLS Ð revealed that in most cases (all cases for
the WERS04) the latter exceeded the former, while
preserving levels of statistical significance. More-
over, the union status variables were unaffected. Fi-
nally, we performed an augmented regression test,
as proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993,
p. 236). Specifically, we included both the actual and
predicted measures of training together in each of
the performance equations: circumstances in which
the coefficient on the predicted training measure is
statistically significant can be interpreted as indicat-
ing that that the instrumental variables approach is
consistent. For the WERS98, in seven of the twelve
equations, the predicted measure of training was sta-
tistically significant (p < 0.05) and the union coeffi-
cients were unaffected. For the WERS04, on the
other hand, the coefficients were mostly insignifi-
cant, reflecting the generally weaker results we re-
view below.
Turning therefore to the performance equations,
panels (a) and (b) of Table 4 present the labour pro-
ductivity results for WERS98 and WERS04, respec-
tively, using instrumented plant-level training varia-
bles. For the earlier survey, the coefficient estimates
for predicted training Ð incidence, intensity, and du-
ration Ð are each positive and statistically signifi-
cant. For its part, the simple union variable Ð union
recognition Ð is with one exception poorly deter-
mined, and the interaction term between union rec-
ognition and the training measure is never statisti-
cally significant. For equations taking explicit ac-
count of the bargaining structure there are few sta-
tistically significant coefficients, except for single-ta-
ble bargaining which shows a negative relationship
to labour productivity. The results for the WERS04
are similar in several respects. Thus, the coefficient
estimate for the predicted training argument is again
positive and statistically significant throughout Ð al-
beit now only marginally so for training duration Ð
and the simple union recognition variable is never
statistically significant when interacted with pre-
dicted training. That said, single-table bargaining is
now associated with higher labour productivity and
conversely for separate bargaining with a number of
unions. If these two latter results are regarded as
more consistent with one’s priors, note however that
the directional effects of each variable are reversed
in interactions with predicted training.
Finally, Table 5 charts the association between train-
ing, unions, and financial performance. Comparison
of panels (a) and (b) of the table now indicates
sharp differences between the two workplace sur-
veys. First, for the WERS98 predicted training is
positively associated with above average financial
performance, whereas for the WERS04 no such as-
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sociation is evident. Second, in results reminiscent
of a much earlier literature, the effects of union rec-
ognition on financial performance are adverse in
two out of three specifications for the WERS04,
while no such negative effects are discerned for the
WERS98. Third, single-table bargaining is associ-
ated with below average financial performance in
the WERS98, whereas for the WERS04 it is sepa-
rate bargaining with several unions that is associated
with this outcome. The latter results pertaining to
bargaining structure mirror those reported earlier in
Table 4 for labour productivity (as do the respective
interactions with predicted training).
Given the subjective nature of the productivity and
financial performance variables, however, we should
be wary of placing too much emphasis on the speci-
fics of the above. Moreover, these results are non-
commensurate with the earnings findings and it will
be interesting to see if they will be corroborated us-
ing objective measures that can be fashioned out of
the Financial Performance Questionnaire of
WERS04. That said, there is a measure of consist-
ency in the labour productivity results. Moreover,
the type of training considered here does seem to
be pro-productive and unionism does not seem to
prejudice its payoff in any consistent manner.
5 Conclusions
This study is the first using WERS data to examine
the impact of training at the workplace on earnings,
labour productivity, and financial performance. It
does so in a framework that accords equal emphasis
to labour unions. Contrary to the predictions of the
simple competitive model at least, union recognition
does not appear to reduce the frequency of em-
ployer-provided off-the-job training. Indeed, indi-
vidual worker data suggest that training duration
may be longer in certain union bargaining regimes.
Plant-level training data also contain no suggestion
of any reduction in training incidence or coverage
in union regimes, but do hint that training duration
may be reduced in situations where multiple unions
bargain separately.
What of the productivity of training? Although
there are some differences between the results ob-
tained from individual and plant-level earnings data,
the productivity of training is at least weakly con-
firmed in the earnings data. The suggestion that sin-
gle-table bargaining may actually be associated with
higher returns to training (incidence in the matched
employee-employer regressions and to duration in
the workplace-level estimates) has also to be consid-Unions, Training and Firm Performance John T. Addison and Clive R. Belfield
ered alongside some other less positive results (spe-
cifically, negative interactions between union recog-
nition and some training durations in the matched
data).
If we were to stop here, we might conclude that the
balance of our evidence is more favourable to the
new view of unionism than to the standard competi-
tive model. But we are not speaking of a ringing
endorsement, which recognition led us to experi-
ment with a more direct measure of output than
earnings. Our investigation of a subjective measure
of labour productivity taken from the management
survey cast some doubt on the new view of unionism
while considerably strengthening the pro-productiv-
ity effects of training. In the former case, we are
speaking of the appearance of some negative direct
union effects rather than a reduced payoff to train-
ing in union regimes. Our separate analysis of finan-
cial performance produced results that were broadly
consistent with the same-survey labour productivity
results although only for the WERS98 was there the
clear suggestion that training benefits the bottom
line.
Finally, we should note the difficulties of measuring
training and identifying its impacts across entire es-
tablishments. Many individual workers may engage
in and benefit from training, even in firms where
little training is undertaken; these effects will be
hard to capture if there is significant within-firm var-
iation in training compared to between-firm varia-
tion. Here we are constrained by the data, which
ruled out the use of a fixed effects estimator. How-
ever, we were able to use both workplace and indi-
vidual data, with multiple measures of wages, train-
ing, and unionization. Moreover, our inquiry further
looked to impacts along the dimensions of overall
labour productivity and financial performance.
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